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REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AFTER TRINKO
Michael A. Carrier*
INTRODUCTION
Refusals to license intellectual property (IP) present one of the
thorniest issues in antitrust law. Such activity is privileged under the
IP regime, the foundation of which is the right to exclude. But it may
be punished under antitrust law, which focuses on competition.
The courts have promulgated a number of inconsistent tests in de-
termining whether IP refusals to license constitute monopolization.
They have granted absolute immunity to the patentee, applied various
rebuttable presumptions, and examined whether an "essential facility"
was denied. Throughout this disarray, the Supreme Court has stayed
on the sidelines. But the recent decision of Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. (Trinko),1 which ad-
dressed a telephone company's refusal to share its network with rivals,
provides a range of clues as to how the Court would treat IP refusals
to license.
In Part II of this Article, I articulate five approaches for IP refusals
to license that courts have elucidated in recent years. In Part III, I
analyze six elements of the Trinko opinion that shed light on the
Court's likely treatment of such conduct. In particular, I examine the
Court's general themes of the benefits of monopoly power, the dan-
gers of sharing, and the costs of antitrust, and specific treatment of
claims addressing refusals to deal, essential facilities, and monopoly
leveraging.
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. I would like to thank
Mike Jacobs and Bobbi Kwall for the invitation to participate in the DePaul University Center
for Intellectual Property Law & Information's (CIPLIT) Sixth Annual Symposium, Intellectual
Property Licensing by the Dominant Firm: Issues and Problems.
1. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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II. THE TESTS
Courts have articulated a number of tests in analyzing refusals to
license IP.2 This section examines five cases that reveal the diversity
of approaches that courts have applied to monopolists' refusals to li-
cense IP. The tests offer analyses based on (1) absolute immunity, (2)
near-absolute immunity, (3) presumptive legality, (4) presumptive le-
gality with an intent-based rebuttal, and (5) essential facilities.
A. Absolute Immunity: SCM
The first approach is presented by SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.
(SCM).3 In this case, Xerox acquired a patent on a process for copy-
ing documents that allowed images to be reproduced on plain paper.4
It refused to grant a license to a competitor, SCM, that wished to man-
ufacture its own plain-paper copier.5 SCM sued, claiming that Xerox's
acquisition of patents and subsequent refusal to license the patents
constituted monopolization. 6
The Second Circuit began by explaining that the patent and anti-
trust laws "necessarily clash" when "the patented product is so suc-
cessful that it evolves into its own economic market ... or succeeds in
engulfing a large section of a preexisting product market."'7 A paten-
tee, however, that merely exercises its right to exclude by unilaterally
refusing to license the patent undertakes activity that is "expressly
permitted by the patent laws."'8 Moreover, it "would seriously
threaten the integrity of the patent system" if a patentee were to be
punished with "treble damages based on what a reviewing court might
later consider, with the benefit of hindsight, to be too much success
.... -9 The court concluded: "[W]here a patent has been lawfully
acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws can-
not trigger any liability under the antitrust laws." 10 Because the court
found that Xerox had lawfully acquired the patents, its refusal to li-
cense was permissible." Other courts have similarly provided abso-
lute immunity to the patentee under § 2 of the Sherman Act,
2. Parts of this discussion are drawn from Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust
Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002).
3. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
4. Id. at 1197.
5. Id. at 1200.
6. Id. at 1197.
7. Id. at 1203.
8. Id. at 1204.
9. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1206.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1209.
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reasoning that the patentee is merely exercising its rights under the
patent laws. 12
B. Near-Absolute Immunity: Xerox
The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Independent Service Organi-
zations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox) 13 provides another example of an
approach offering substantial deference to patentees. Xerox manufac-
tured, sold, and serviced high-volume photocopiers. 14 It instituted a
policy of not selling parts for one (and later, all) of its lines of copiers
to independent service organizations (ISOs) unless they also were
end-users of the copiers. 15 At one point, Xerox cut off certain ISOs'
abilities to directly purchase such restricted parts. 16 A class of ISOs
filed an antitrust lawsuit, and Xerox settled the suit by agreeing to
suspend its parts policy and licensing its diagnostic software for a pe-
riod of time. 17 One ISO opted out of the settlement and sued, claim-
ing that Xerox violated the antitrust laws by selling patented parts at
higher prices to ISOs than to end users in order to force ISOs to in-
crease their prices.18 Such conduct ostensibly was designed to elimi-
nate ISOs as competitors in service markets for Xerox copiers.
The Federal Circuit held that Xerox did not violate § 2.19 The court
emphasized the centrality of the right to exclude in the patent system
12. See, e.g., Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir.
1987) ("A patent holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by refusing to li-
cense the patent to others."); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135
(D. Kan. 1997) (holding that there can be "no unlawful leveraging of monopoly power when a
patent holder merely exercises its [patent] rights"); Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 902 F.
Supp. 741, 743 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("Under patent and copyright law, [the patent holder] may not
be compelled to license its proprietary software to anyone."); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc. v.
Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., No. C93-20079 JW, 1995 WL 798935, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1995)
("[I]t is not a violation of antitrust law ... to refuse to sell, license or commercially transfer
copyrighted information to anyone .... [This is true] even if customers are put in the position of
only getting the benefit of the copyrighted items if they hire [the copyright owners]."); Advanced
Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 370 n.17 (E.D. Va. 1994) (deciding that
protecting a copyright is a valid business justification for limiting a license).
13. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
14. Id. at 1324.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (D. Kan.
1997) (setting forth the factual history concerning Xerox's efforts to "use price as a weapon to
defeat ISO competition in the service market").
19. As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc. (Kodak 1), 504 U.S. 451 (1992), that one brand of a product could constitute an
antitrust market and a manufacturer in a competitive "primary" market could thus have monop-
oly power in the "secondary" market of the servicing of parts of its own equipment, many manu-
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before carving out three limited categories in which a patentholder
would not be immune from antitrust liability: (1) tying patented and
unpatented products, (2) obtaining a patent through knowing and
willful fraud, and (3) engaging in sham litigation.20 The Federal Cir-
cuit also refused to examine the patentee's subjective intent in refus-
ing to deal with a competitor.21 And it confirmed that action "within
the scope" of the patent grant could not violate the antitrust laws.22
Because the court concluded that "Xerox's refusal to sell its patented
parts [did not] exceed[ ] the scope of the patent grant" and did not fall
within any of the three exceptions, it concluded that Xerox "did not
violate the antitrust laws .... "23
C. Presumptive Legality: Data General
Several cases have applied a rebuttable presumption that a refusal
to license IP does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act. The first case to
offer such a presumption was Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys-
tems Support Corp. (Data General).24 In that case, Data General cre-
ated a sophisticated computer program that diagnosed problems in its
computers. 25 Data General occupied approximately ninety percent of
the "aftermarket" for the service of its computers; Grumman had ap-
proximately three percent.2 6 Data General had initially pursued lib-
eral policies that allowed third parties to use the diagnostic software.27
But it subsequently altered these policies, restricting the licensing of
the software to its own technicians and equipment owners who per-
formed their own service.28 As a result, Grumman was not able to use
the software. Data General sued Grumman for copyright infringe-
facturers of durable products requiring service of parts, such as Xerox, could be treated as
monopolists. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1322, 1326.
20. 203 F.3d at 1326. "Fraud" is to be determined by reference to the case of Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). To prove the
"sham" exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the suit is objectively baseless and "moti-
vated by a desire to impose collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable
legal remedy." Id. (internal citation omitted). The court borrowed its exceptions to immunity
from patent infringement lawsuits even though the exceptions are largely irrelevant for refusals
to license.
21. 203 F.3d at 1327.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1328. The court also adopted an approach immunizing copyright-based action as
long as the copyrights were obtained lawfully and not used to gain monopoly power beyond the
copyright grant. Id. at 1329.
24. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
25. Id. at 1152.
26. Id. Data General had approximately five percent of the primary market for mini-com-
puters. Id.
27. Id. at 1154.
28. Id.
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ment and trade secret misappropriation, and Grumman filed an anti-
trust counterclaim challenging Data General's refusal to license the
diagnostic software.2 9
The First Circuit began by exploring the purposes of the antitrust
and IP laws and the history of courts' treatment of the intersection.30
It then articulated the legislative assumption underlying the copyright
laws that the right to exclude "creates a system of incentives that pro-
motes consumer welfare ... by encouraging investment in the creation
of desirable artistic [ ] works of expression. '31 Antitrust defendants,
according to the court, cannot be required "to prove and reprove the
merits of [the] legislative assumption in every case where a refusal to
license a copyrighted work comes under attack. '32
The court therefore concluded that a party's "desire to exclude
others from the use of its [protected] work is a presumptively valid
business justification. . . -33 But it never explained precisely how the
presumption could be rebutted, stating only that "there may be rare
cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the
objectives of the Copyright Act."'34 In this case, Data General's exer-
cise of its right to exclude was "a presumptively valid business justifi-
cation" that Grumman could not rebut.35
D. Presumptive Legality With Intent-Based Rebuttal: Kodak II
One way to rebut the presumption would be to rely on the defen-
dant's intent. Such an approach was famously applied by the Ninth
Circuit in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Ko-
dak 1/),3 6 another case in which ISOs sued the manufacturer of a dura-
ble product.
Kodak manufactured high volume photocopiers. The market for
such copiers was competitive, and it included Xerox, IBM, and Ca-
non.37 Kodak also sold and installed replacement parts for its copiers;
29. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1155 & n.8. Grumman also challenged as a "tying arrangement"
Data General's requirement that consumers wishing to utilize the software also purchase sup-
port services from the company. Id. at 1156.
30. Id. at 1185-87.
31. Id. at 1186-87.
32. Id. at 1187.
33. Id.
34. 36 F.3d at 1187 n.64. For a recent example of a court following Data General, see Telecom
Technical Services Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 827 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding no harm to con-
sumers from a refusal to sell repair parts).
35. 36 F.3d at 1187-88.
36. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
37. Id. at 1200.
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in this activity, Kodak and ISOs competed. 38 Of the machines it man-
ufactured, Kodak repaired at least eighty percent.39 Although the
company had, at one time, sold parts for repair service to ISOs, it
began to restrict this practice as competition from the ISOs in-
creased.40 As a result of the limited access, "ISOs lack[ed] a reliable
supply of parts," and thus were not able to compete with Kodak in
providing multi-year service contracts.41 Several ISOs claimed that
they were forced out of business as a result of the parts shortage.4 2
The ISOs sued Kodak, claiming that its restrictive parts policy vio-
lated § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act.4 3 The district court granted
summary judgment for Kodak,44 but the Ninth Circuit reversed.45 The
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal46 and on remand from the Su-
preme Court, a jury entered a verdict against Kodak. 47
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the verdict.48 To ensure that the jury
would account for the "procompetitive effects and statutory rights ex-
tended by the intellectual property laws,"'4 9 the court adopted the
Data General presumption that a party's "desire to exclude others
from [use of] its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business
justification. °50 But the Ninth Circuit held that the presumption could
be rebutted by evidence of pretext.5' The court explained: "Neither
the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify al-
lowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to
mask anticompetitive conduct. '5 2
In applying its rebuttable presumption, the court found that "the
proffered business justification played no part in the [defendant's] de-
cision to act."'53 The court explained that "Kodak photocopy and
micrographics equipment requires thousands of parts, of which only
65 were patented" and that "Kodak's parts manager testified that pat-
ents 'did not cross [his] mind' at the time [the company] began the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1201.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Kodak H, 125 F.3d at 1201.
43. Id.
44. No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17218 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988).
45. 903 F.2d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 1990).
46. 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992).
47. No. C 87-1686 AWT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2386, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1996).
48. 125 F.3d 1195, 1228 (9th Cir. 1997).
49. Id. at 1218.
50. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 1219.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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parts policy."'54 As a result, the court concluded that "it is more prob-
able than not that the jury would have found Kodak's presumptively
valid business justification rebutted on the grounds of pretext. '55
Even though the district court's instructions to the jury "fail[ed] to
give any weight to Kodak's [IP] rights," the court concluded that such
error was harmless. 56
E. Essential Facility: Intel
The district court in Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp. (Intel)57 demon-
strated the final approach, one relying on the "essential facilities"
doctrine.
Intel is the world's largest designer, manufacturer, and supplier of
high-performance computer microprocessors, which are often de-
scribed as the "brains" of a computer. 58 Intergraph used Intel
microprocessors in the computer workstations that it developed and
sold. 59 At one time, Intergraph manufactured microprocessors, but it
then ceased production, converting its products to incorporate Intel's
microprocessors. 60 It made this transition based on Intel's assurances
that its central processing units (CPUs) could support Intergraph's
workstations and that it would supply its CPUs to Intergraph on fair
terms.61 But when Intel developed its Pentium II microprocessors, it
shifted away from the "open architecture" that it had made available
to all participants in the industry and embraced a proprietary architec-
ture.62 As a result of this change, computers manufactured by original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) had to meet the technical require-
ments of the Intel architecture in order to use Intel microprocessors. 63
After this development, an unrelated patent dispute between the par-
ties arose; as a result, Intergraph filed patent infringement claims
against OEM customers of Intel. Intel responded by refusing to pro-
vide to Intergraph confidential information necessary for product de-
velopment that it had previously provided.64 Intergraph thus was not
54. 125 F.3d at 1219 (first alteration in original).
55. Id. at 1219-20.
56. Id. at 1218.
57. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
58. Id. at 1259.
59. Id. at 1263.
60. Id. at 1264.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1261.
63. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
64. Id. at 1267.
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able to receive advance samples of Intel microprocessors and could
not deploy its products at the same time that competitors could.65
The court first found that Intel had a monopoly in markets for
CPUs and in markets for Intel CPUs. 66 It then treated Intel's refusal
to deal as the denial of an essential facility. 67 The essential facilities
doctrine provides that a monopolist cannot deny to its competitors
facilities that are necessary to compete in a particular market. 68 A
plaintiff relying on the theory must show "(1) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability ... to duplicate
the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility ... and (4)
the feasibility of providing the facility. '69
The court found that "[r]easonable and timely access to critical bus-
iness information that is necessary to compete is an essential facil-
ity."'70 It then elevated the protection of competitors to a critical
objective of the antitrust laws: "[A] monopolist's unilateral refusal to
deal violates § 2 of the Sherman Act where such conduct unreasona-
bly handicaps competitors or harms competition."'' a The court con-
cluded that Intel withheld an essential facility: "Intel's refusal to
supply advanced CPUs and essential technical information to Inter-
graph likely72 violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, because they are not
available from alternative sources and cannot be feasibly duplicated,
and because competitors cannot effectively compete in the relevant
markets without access to them. ' 73 Even though the Intel district
court decision was vacated by the Federal Circuit on the ground that
Intel and Intergraph were not competitors in any relevant market,74
65. Id. at 1269.
66. Id. at 1275.
67. Id. at 1278.
68. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (holding that an
electric utility company could not prevent towns from using its transmission system after its
retail electric power distribution franchise expired).
69. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
71. Id.
72. The court did not definitively find a substantive violation because it considered the issue in
the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1258.
73. Id. at 1278. The court also concluded that Intel "ha[d] no legitimate business reason to
refuse to deal with Intergraph" since it had been a "loyal and beneficial customer" and the
dispute over Intergraph's patent claims "could [have been] resolved separately without Intel
denying Intergraph information it need[ed]." Id. In addition, the court dismissed any defense
based on intellectual property, finding that Intel "has no legitimate intellectual property basis
with which it can refuse to supply Intel microprocessors and technical information to Intergraph
.... I d. at 1279.
74. 195 F.3d 1346, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also id. at 1358 ("The district court erred in
holding that Intel's superior microprocessor product and Intergraph's dependency thereon con-
verted Intel's special customer benefits into an 'essential facility' under the Sherman Act.").
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the approach (which has garnered attention in recent years) counsels
considerable caution, as it could apply in any market in which a mo-
nopolist relies on intellectual property, with an excluded party claim-
ing that the property is "essential" to compete in the market.75
In short, the CSU, Xerox, Data General, Kodak II, and Intel courts
reveal an array of disparate approaches to IP refusals to license. This
muddled area of law therefore can benefit from a close reading of the
Court's Trinko decision.
III. TRINKO OPINION
In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
L.L.P.,76 the Supreme Court held that an incumbent telephone com-
pany's refusal to share its network with rivals did not violate § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Though not directly addressing IP refusals to license,
the Court's likely treatment of such issues can be pieced together from
several aspects of this opinion.
A. Factual Setting
The Trinko case arose in the shadow of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.77 Before the passage of the Act, telephone companies
known as incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) possessed state-
provided monopolies in the provision of local service. 78 The difficulty
of replicating the ILECs' networks-which encompassed the "local
loop," or "last mile" of wire to millions of residential and commercial
locations-gave the ILECs "an almost insurmountable competitive
advantage not only in routing calls within the exchange, but.., in the
markets for terminal equipment and long-distance calling as well."'79
In seeking to break up the local monopolies and increase competi-
tion, Congress imposed duties on ILECs that facilitated competitors'
entry into local markets.80 In particular, ILECs were required to
75. For additional criticism of this doctrine, see, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An
Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990). For another application of
the doctrine to IP, see David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (rejecting claim by seller of disk caching program that Microsoft denied essential facility
by including disk caching function in operating system).
76. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
77. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
78. The local exchange network consists of "the local loops (wires connecting telephones to
switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the transport trunks
(wires carrying calls between switches)." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371
(1999).
79. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 490 (2002).
80. 540 U.S. at 401.
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share their network with competitors by offering local services for re-
sale and by providing "access to elements of the network on an 'un-
bundled' basis."8' Through such utilization or resale, new entrants,
known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), were able to
offer local service. 82
Verizon, an ILEC, was charged with these duties. Accordingly, it
"signed interconnection agreements with rivals such as AT&T" that
specified "the terms on which it [was to] make its network elements
available. ' 83 It also took advantage of the opportunity-not available
to ILECs before the passage of the Act-to enter the long-distance
market. In order to enter the market, Verizon needed to satisfy a
checklist of statutory requirements that included nondiscriminatory
access to elements of the network. 84
A local telephone service customer of AT&T, the law firm of Curtis
V. Trinko, L.L.P., filed a complaint alleging that Verizon (then Bell
Atlantic) discriminated against CLECs. 85 It contended that Verizon
"has not afforded CLECs access to the local loop on a par with its
own access."'86 In particular, Verizon "has filled orders of CLEC cus-
tomers after filling those for its own local phone service [and] has
failed to fill in a timely manner, or not at all, a substantial number of
orders for CLEC customers substantially identical in circumstances to
its own local phone service customers for whom it has filled orders on
a timely basis .... "87 Such activity naturally would make it more
difficult for CLECs to compete in the market for local telephone ser-
vice and could maintain the ILECs' local service monopolies.
The district court dismissed the complaint. The Second Circuit re-
versed in part, finding that the complaint stated a claim under the es-
sential facilities and monopoly leveraging doctrines and that the
passage of the 1996 Act did not preempt the application of antitrust.88
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia on behalf of six Justices, the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.89 One focal point of its
opinion was the existence of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
81. Id. at 402; see also 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000).
82. 540 U.S. at 402.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 402-03; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 271.
85. 540 U.S. at 404.
86. Amended Complaint at J 21, Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (No. 00 Civ. 1910 (SHS) (JCF)), available at 2001 WL 34727769.
87. Id.
88. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 108-09 (2d Cir.
2002).
89. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined
the opinion. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas, authored a concurring opin-
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which, in opening up local markets and facilitating competition,
demonstrated a regulatory regime serving many of the same purposes
as antitrust (and therefore reducing, if not eliminating, the need for
antitrust). This aspect of the opinion likely will not affect IP refusals
to license because, in contrast to the telecommunications regime, the
right to exclude at the foundation of IP often contravenes the goal of
competition.
Several other parts of the opinion nonetheless are instructive. In
particular, six aspects shed light on how the Court might analyze IP
refusals to license: (1) the benefits of monopoly power, (2) the dan-
gers of sharing, (3) the costs of antitrust, (4) refusals to deal, (5) essen-
tial facilities, and (6) monopoly leveraging. The first three present
general themes and the latter three focus on particular antitrust
doctrines.
B. Monopoly Power and Incentives
The first general theme comes from the Court's discussion of mo-
nopoly power. The activity at issue in Trinko, a company's denial of
interconnection services to a rival, is a form of unilateral conduct that
courts consider under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Oft-cited case law re-
quires a plaintiff alleging a § 2 violation to demonstrate both monop-
oly power and monopoly conduct.
In discussing the first requirement, the Court lauded monopoly
power, explaining that a firm's ability to charge monopoly prices "is
an important element of the free-market system." 90 The "opportunity
to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what at-
tracts 'business acumen' in the first place [by] induc[ing] risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth." 91 In order, then,
"[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate," courts cannot condemn the
possession of monopoly power alone.92 While numerous pre-Trinko
courts had explained that a firm's mere possession of monopoly power
does not violate § 2, no court had so fervently defended monopoly
power. 93
ion that concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action. 540 U.S. at 416
(Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 407 (majority opinion).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. For a critique of the Court's argument, see Michael A. Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and
Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP. L. 101 (2005) (explaining that the Court "short-circuits the
debate that has raged . .. in the economic literature about the market structure that best pro-
motes innovation" and that it "does not support its assertion that the quest for monopoly power
provides the motivation driving firms today").
12012006]
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The Court's statements on monopoly power would apply forcefully
to IP. To be sure, the existence of a patent or copyright does not
necessarily (or even in most cases) signify monopoly power.94 But if
incentives are critical anywhere, it is in the context of IP.
The traditional story explaining IP is that the nonexclusive and
nonrivalrous nature of information prevents owners from appropriat-
ing the rewards of their creations. 95 The patent and copyright laws are
designed to address this problem by granting a right to exclude. This
right allows creators to charge prices in excess of the marginal cost of
producing their inventions so that they can not only recover their ini-
tial expenditures but also receive profits.96 But the right to exclude,
and the incentives for innovation it promotes, could be compromised
by the application of antitrust. In short, the Court's emphasis on the
role of monopoly power in driving innovation and economic growth is
magnified when the incentives apply not only at the general level of a
firm's risk-taking activity but also at the more specific level of the
unique risks facing IP holders.
C. Sharing
The second insight comes from the Court's recitation of four dan-
gers that would result if a firm were forced to share its facilities with
competitors. First, sharing contravenes the "purpose of antitrust law,"
which promotes incentives to invest. 97 Second, it requires courts to
"act as central planners . . . a role for which they are ill-suited. '98
Third, sharing facilitates collusion, which is "the supreme evil of anti-
trust." 99 And fourth, it intrudes upon the rights of manufacturers to
select the parties with whom they wish to deal. 100
94. See, e.g., ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RiGHTs 16 (1989) (reporting that in a survey of patent licensors, no close substitutes
existed for the patented product in only twenty-seven percent of cases, and that there were more
than ten competitors in more than twenty-nine percent of cases); Kenneth W. Dam, The Eco-
nomic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 249-51 (1994); see also id. at 250
("[Ljeading companies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and yet many such
firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any market.").
95. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2004) ("Nonexclusivity prevents owners from excluding others from the posses-
sion of information .... Nonrivalrousness magnifies this danger because one person's consump-
tion does not diminish the amount of the good for others to consume .... ). For a critique of
the traditional story of IP, see id. at 34-44.
96. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 622 (3d ed. 1990).
97. 540 U.S. at 407-08.
98. Id. at 408.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 407-08.
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These arguments would apply most powerfully to IP holders. The
right to exclude is, once again, the foundation of the IP system.1 1 If
sharing is contrary to antitrust, then it is anathema to IP. Moreover,
to the extent that the Court focuses on "incentives to invest" as the
purpose of antitrust law,102 such incentives are even more directly im-
plicated by the IP system.
Even the provisions in the IP laws-such as compulsory licenses in
copyright law and government appropriation in patent law-that pro-
vide for compensated sharing would not provide material support for
a court's compelling the sharing of IP under § 2.103 For the calculation
of royalty rates for compulsory licensing would require courts to act as
the forbidden "central planners."
D. Antitrust's Costs
The disadvantages of antitrust garner much attention from the
Court. One cost is the difficulty of applying § 2 because "the means of
illicit exclusion . ..are myriad.' 0 4 A second involves the conse-
quences of false condemnations, which "are especially costly, because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to pro-
tect."'105 Third, oversight by antitrust tribunals "would seem destined
to distort investment and lead to a new layer of interminable litiga-
tion."'01 6 And fourth, remediation would "require continuing supervi-
sion of a highly detailed decree," which courts could not effectively
do.'0 7
These costs would be particularly significant in the context of IP.
By wrongfully punishing IP holders' refusals to deal, false positives
would adversely affect not only competition but also the separate in-
centive system underlying IP. Concerns of distorted investment simi-
larly would apply directly to IP. And the courts could be forced to
oversee detailed decrees in ordering royalty-based compulsory licens-
ing. Applying the costs of antitrust to IP thus would counsel against
punishing IP refusals to license.
101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
102. For a critique of this development, see Carrier, supra note 93, at 110.
103. For compulsory licenses in copyright, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (retransmission of
broadcasts by cable and satellite television companies), id. § 115 ("cover" licenses for musical
works), id. § 118 (public broadcasting). For government appropriation in patent law, see 28
U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
104. 540 U.S. at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 415.
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In short, the general themes of the benefits of monopoly power, the
dangers of sharing, and the costs of antitrust all counsel deference to
refusals to deal. The especially direct application of these concepts to
IP refusals to license makes it even less likely that the Court would
penalize such conduct.
E. Aspen Skiing and Refusals to Deal
The Court's application of specific monopolization doctrines con-
firms its general themes. The most important monopolization doc-
trine discussed in Trinko is the refusal to deal. In particular, the case
of Aspen Skiing takes center stage in the Court's discussion. 108 In
Aspen Skiing, the Court found a § 2 violation when the owner of sev-
eral downhill skiing facilities withdrew from a joint ticketing arrange-
ment with its competitor. 10 9 The Trinko Court asserted that Aspen
Skiing was "at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability."110 It stated
that the withdrawal "suggested a willingness to forsake short-term
profits to achieve an anticompetitive end" and that the defendant's
unwillingness to accept the retail price "revealed a distinctly anticom-
petitive bent."'11
Verizon, in contrast, did not evidence such behavior. It did not en-
gage in a voluntary course of dealing with its rivals or (obviously)
withdraw from such a relationship.112 Nor did it "turn[ ] down a pro-
posal to sell at its own retail price.' 13 The Court also distinguished
the type of service offered from that in previous cases. In Aspen Ski-
ing and Otter Tail,114 the defendants offered ski lift tickets and power
transmission, respectively, services that were already available to the
public.11 5 In contrast, Verizon was required to share unbundled net-
work elements, a "brand new" type of service that "exist[ed] only
deep within the bowels of Verizon . "...,116 These network elements
were "offered not to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable ex-
pense and effort. 1117 Largely because Verizon's conduct did not re-
108. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
109. Id. at 609-11.
110. 540 U.S. at 409.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
115. 540 U.S. at 410.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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semble the defendant's activity in Aspen Skiing, the Court concluded
that Trinko failed to offer a cognizable refusal-to-deal claim. 118
In its discussion of Aspen Skiing, the Court does not clearly articu-
late which of several potential tests for exclusionary conduct it is ap-
plying. Three related possibilities come to mind.
The first requires a cognizable refusal-to-deal claim to mirror the
facts of Aspen Skiing itself: a party's termination of a voluntary
course of dealing and resultant sacrifice of short-term profits. The
second is slightly broader, adopting a "short-term sacrifice" test simi-
lar to that applied in predatory pricing claims, in which the Court pun-
ishes only a monopolist's pricing below cost, which sacrifices
profits. 119 The third is slightly broader still, analyzing whether the de-
fendant-even if it does not sacrifice profits-fails to offer a legiti-
mate business justification for its conduct. All three of the approaches
are consistent with the Court's refusal-to-deal analysis in Trinko.
The Court explained, for example, that Verizon did not "voluntarily
engage[] in a course of dealing with its rivals,"1 20 which distinguishes
the case from Aspen Skiing and removes an indicator that could have
revealed a sacrifice of profits or the lack of a business justification. It
also noted that Verizon's "reluctance to interconnect at [a] cost-based
rate of compensation" is distinct from the Aspen Skiing defendant's
rejection of a proposal to sell at its retail price and does not provide
clues as to sacrifice or business justification.' 21 Finally, Verizon's re-
luctance to offer a new service differs from the Aspen Skiing defen-
dant's refusal to provide a product it already sold to consumers and
does not as readily demonstrate sacrifice or lack of business
justification.122
118. Id. The Court also distinguished the cases of United States v. Terminal Railroad Associa-
tion, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), on the grounds
that those cases involved concerted action. 540 U.S. at 410 n.3.
119. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 & n.1
(1993) (stating that plaintiff must show that defendant priced "below an appropriate measure of
its ... costs").
120. 540 U.S. at 409.
121. Id.
122. In addition to not clarifying what standard it was applying, the Court discerned much
from a barren record, having arrived at the Court in the context of a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). For example, the Court seemed overly eager to distinguish Verizon's behavior
from that of the defendant in Aspen Skiing even though the compensation Verizon gave up
under § 251(c)(3) was not just "cost-based" but also included a reasonable profit. See Local
Competition Order 738 (explaining that Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC) allows incumbents "to recover a fair return on their investment" because it "pro-
duce[s] rates for monopoly elements and services that approximate what the incumbent LECs
would be able to charge if there were a competitive market for such offerings").
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In the context of a patentee monopolist's refusal to deal, it would
appear that a post-Trinko plaintiff would need to demonstrate an
Aspen-like scenario to succeed under § 2.123 The first of the three in-
terpretations of the Court's analysis, the Aspen case itself, most obvi-
ously requires a withdrawal from an existing licensing arrangement.
And the other two interpretations-the sacrifice and business justifi-
cation tests-will typically mirror the Aspen scenario as well. To be
clear, many patentee monopolists' withdrawals from ongoing arrange-
ments will not be subject to § 2 liability. Circumstances may have
changed, rendering continued participation in the venture unprofita-
ble. But in most cases, 124 a withdrawal from an ongoing arrangement
will be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition to show sacrifice
or a lack of a business justification. 125
When a patentee decides to license its patent and then withdraws
from the arrangement, questions of sacrifice and business justification
arise. After all, the initial decision to license demonstrates a firm's
business decision that a particular patent could be commercially suc-
cessful. It also shows that the patentee-who in many cases is not the
ideal candidate to distribute the product in all markets-would bene-
fit from another entity's distribution. 126 The decision, then, to with-
draw from a licensing arrangement introduces (though, again, does
not resolve) questions of sacrifice and justification similar to those in
Aspen Skiing.
In contrast, a patentee that has never licensed its patent may have
justifiable reasons for its reluctance. It could determine that its prod-
uct Will not be commercially successful. Such a determination would
be consistent with most patentees' decisions not to exploit their pat-
123. The analysis in the text refers to simple refusals to license. In contrast, conditional refus-
als to license generally receive less deference because the condition itself may violate another
antitrust provision, such as § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act. 3 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 709a, at 219-20 (2d ed. 2002).
124. One exception could apply when a monopolist acquires but then suppresses patents. In
an extreme case, a court could conclude that such activity violates § 2. See id. I 708e, at 218
(positing example of monopolist buying exclusive licenses to all patents in a particular field and
refusing to license such patents to competitors). Liability (under the sacrifice or business justifi-
cation tests) might be appropriate in such. a case because the traditional story explaining IT is
less directly implicated and the acquisition provides some indication of commercial value.
125. To be clear, in nearly all cases, antitrust courts should not punish a firm's unilateral re-
fusal to license IP. But even though such exclusion is expressly authorized by the patent laws,
see 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000), in certain cases-such as where a refusal to license lacks any business
justification-it may not be entitled to absolute immunity from the antitrust laws.
126. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2.3 (1995) (explaining benefits of licensing).
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ents.1 27 It also would be consistent with the right to exclude (not use)
underlying the IP laws. In the absence of a preexisting relationship,
then, courts following Trinko generally will not second-guess patentee
monopolists' refusals to license.
F Essential Facilities
Another doctrine that may be implicated by refusals to deal is the
essential facility doctrine. In Trinko, the Court stated that it "ha[s]
never recognized such a doctrine" and "find[s] no need either to rec-
ognize it or to repudiate it here. ' 128 Nonetheless, it weakened the
doctrine in two material respects.
First, the Court found, on a 12(b)(6) motion and in opposition to
the allegations of the complaint, that there was access to the intercon-
nection facilities at issue, thus precluding the prerequisite unavailabil-
ity of access. 129 Second, it seemingly limited the application of the
doctrine to facilities that had not previously been made available to
the public. In particular, it contrasted the situation in Aspen Skiing
(in which the defendant had provided lift tickets to consumers) and
Otter Tail (in which the defendant had provided power transmission
over its network to customers) with the situation in Trinko (in which
Verizon would be forced to share "'something brand new'-'the
wholesale market for leasing network elements'-with competi-
tors)." 1 30
The refusal to license IP could constitute the denial of an essential
facility under the Court's first conclusion as long as access was in fact
not available. The second finding likely would center the analysis
once again on the existence of a previous course of dealing. If the
patentee had previously licensed the IP, then an essential facility
claim-assuming the satisfaction of the other requirements-still
could be made.
But if the patentee had not previously licensed the IP, then two
interpretations of the Court's opinion are possible. Under one, which
focuses on the liberty of the monopolist to choose not to share facili-
ties that "exist only deep within the bowels" of the company, the pre-
viously unshared nature of IP would appear to preempt an essential
127. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495,
1507 (2001) (estimating that the "total number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty... [is
approximately] five percent of issued patents").
128. 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). Even if the Court had not explicitly articulated an essential
facilities doctrine, previous decisions were consistent with such a doctrine. See Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
129. 540 U.S. at 411; see Amended Complaint, supra note 86, 21.
130. 540 U.S. at 410.
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facility claim. But under the other, which centers on the burden
placed upon the monopolist, the claim would likely not be preempted
because the intangible nature of IP would make it easier and cheaper
to share than physical infrastructure.
IP essential facility claims tempt courts to force the sharing of help-
ful (albeit not essential) facilities.131 For that reason, and because of
the stark contrast between the doctrine and IP's right to exclude, the
Court's restriction of these claims, at least as applied to IP refusals to
license, would appear to be justifiable.
G. Monopoly Leveraging
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of monopoly leveraging,
which targets a monopolist's use of its power in the monopoly market
to gain an advantage in a secondary market.132 The Court made clear,
however, that a party can articulate a successful monopoly leveraging
claim only by showing a "'dangerous probability of success' in mono-
polizing [the] second market. 133
The Court's requirement that the plaintiff show a "dangerous
probability of success" in the secondary market sounds the death knell
for monopoly leveraging. The Second Circuit had recognized a lever-
aging cause of action for a party's use of monopoly power in one mar-
ket "to gain competitive advantage" in another. 134 But requiring a
dangerous probability of success in monopolizing the second market
mirrors the prerequisites of an attempt to monopolize claim, thus re-
moving any independent viability of monopoly leveraging. 135 The
Court's holding on this point is consistent with the text of the Sher-
man Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize
but not abuse of a dominant position,136 and with the majority of
lower court leveraging decisions. 137
The monopoly leveraging conclusion also removes a temptation for
courts to punish IP activity that spills into more than one market. 1
38
131. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
132. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 123, 652a, at 89.
133. 540 U.S. at 415 n.4 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459
(1993)).
134. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting U.S.
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
135. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 123, 773g, at 271 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
136. Id. I 652a, at 89-90.
137. Id. I 652b2, at 93-95.
138. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992)
("The Court has held many times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage
such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his
dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next."').
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Because patents issue for inventions, and not final products, they can
often be mapped onto more than one antitrust market. 139 For exam-
ple, the patent could implicate manufacturing, retail, and service mar-
kets.140 While some such activity may appropriately be analyzed
under the rubric of attempted monopolization or patent misuse,
courts applying the leveraging doctrine could have punished activity
that was a natural consequence of commercializing patented products
and that did not present a harm to antitrust competition.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law on IP refusals to license is, to put it charitably, unclear.
The conflict between antitrust and IP cannot easily be resolved, and
the five approaches that courts have applied to the issue are far from
consistent. Because the Supreme Court has not directly addressed IP
refusals to license, the Trinko case provides a window through which
we can discern otherwise-concealed views on IP refusals to license.
Piecing together Trinko's general themes of the benefits of monop-
oly power, the dangers of sharing, and the costs of antitrust results in a
skeptical view as to whether the Court would punish IP refusals to
license. This conclusion is only strengthened after examining the
Court's holdings on the specific claims relating to refusals to deal, es-
sential facilities, and monopoly leveraging.
The Court's likely deference to IP refusals to license would tend to
support lower court cases proffering absolute (as in SCM) or near-
absolute (Xerox) immunity for refusals to license. It would tend not
to support presumptions that could be rebutted based on intent (Ko-
dak II) or essential facility approaches (Intel district court).
In short, Trinko will certainly not make it any easier for plaintiffs
challenging IP refusals to license. In fact, in its guidance to lower
courts on general themes and specific doctrines, Trinko likely will
make it more difficult to challenge such activity.
139. Carrier, supra note 2, at 792.
140. See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (D. Kan. 1997); see
also id. at 1138 ("The reward for a patented invention is the right to exploit the entire field of the
'invention,' not the right to exploit the single most analogous antitrust market.").
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